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The paper explores the structure of Italian corporate network by focusing on the relationships between financial – 
banks, insurances and holdings – and industrial companies in Italy during the period 1952-83 through the analysis of the 
interlocks that existed between them. By an interlock is meant the link created between two firms when an individual 
belongs to the board of directors of both. The analysis is based on a database – Imita.db – containing data on over 
130,000 directors of Italian joint stock companies for the years 1952, 1960, 1972 and 1983. After showing a descriptive 
statistics  of  the  companies  and  the  directors  included  in  the  database,  the  paper  develops  a  network  connectivity 
analysis of the system. This is integrated by a prosopographic study about the big linkers, defined as those directors 
cumulating the highest number of offices in each benchmark year. The paper confirms that Italian corporate network 
maintained substantial peculiarities in the period investigated. In particular, it argues that interlocks played an important 
role in guaranteeing the stability of the positions of control of the major private companies and their connections with 
state-owned enterprises. In 1952 and 1960, the system, centred on the larger electrical companies, showed the highest 
degree of cohesion. That centre dissolved after nationalisation of the electricity industry in 1962 and was replaced by a 
less strong and cohesive one, hinged on banks, insurances and the major finance companies. At the beginning of the 
1980s the centre appeared to have been further reshaped with the marginalisation of state-owned enterprises.  
 
 






   2 
The ownership structures and organisational formulas – with a large presence of holdings, a wide 
diffusion of family properties and State-owned enterprises, and a relatively low average firm size 
compared to that of other developed countries – characteristic of Italian capitalism are among the 
aspects most debated by historians. From Grifone’s formulation on the centrality of finance capital
1 
to Bonelli’s arguments on capitalism and the State-controlled enterprise
2, up to the neo-Chandlerian 
interpretations of the same phenomenon
3, the subject has passed through the various seasons of 
Italian economic historiography
4. 
The control of a company is the exercise of an influence over its strategic directions and over the 
choices made to operationalise them. The subject of positions of control and of the mechanisms 
which regulate the change in them has assumed considerable importance in all industrial economies, 
and analysis of the relationships between those who have the wealth and those who manage it has 
attracted  the  attention  of  numerous  scholars,  who  have  discussed  the  efficiency  of  the  various 
configurations
5.  Allocation of control over companies and the rules that govern this process have 
contributed  significantly to determining the efficiency of the Italian economic system
6. The aim of 
this study is to identify, using the interlocking directorates (henceforth ID) technique, some features 
of Italian corporate network between 1952 and 1983: in particular, control positions and the group 
structures that followed from these, with particular regard to the relations between state-owned and 
private enterprises. It also examines in detail those mechanisms that guaranteed the consolidation 
and defence of the control positions in the main business groups. Within this context, it becomes 
very important to determine the weight and influence of the relationships between business groups 
and the banking system, by verifying the effects that the 1936 banking law had on them. The paper 
is organised as follows. In section I we review the literature concerning the relevance of ID for the 
analysis of corporate governance, with a special reference to the case of Italy; in section II, we 
illustrate  the  source  utilised  for  this  study;  in  section  III  the  characteristics  of  the  system  are 
illustrated  through  the  use  of  several  indicators  typical  of  network  analysis,  in  section  IV  we 
examine the connections generated by the central actors in the system, the big linkers. Section V 
deals with the role of the banking system, while section VI develops some considerations about the 
forces underlying the inter-company links we have observed. Finally, the paper ends with some 
conclusive remarks. 
I 
Some theoretical approaches have recently been developed to analyse the features of  ownership 
structures. The ‘law and finance’ approach suggests that legal protection of investors is the crucial 
determinant of capital market development, ownership concentration and organisational structures, 
and argues that legal protection is ultimately a by-product of a country’s legal tradition
7. According   3 
to this view, if a country offers a high level of protection to shareholders, typical of common law 
regulation, its economy will be characterised by a higher incidence of widely held companies à la 
Berle and Means
8. On the contrary, countries with a low level of shareholder protection, typical of 
civil law regulation, are generally characterized by a greater ownership concentration with a large 
diffusion of cross-shareholdings, differential voting rights and pyramidal groups
9. Control is so 
valuable in the latter countries that companies will strive to make it not contestable
10. 
More recently, by observing that the structure of financial systems is not uniform over time, an 
alternative approach, known as ‘political economy’, has been proposed
11. This view maintains that a 
country’s financial system and governance structure are not determined by unchanging institutional 
factors, but mainly by the behaviour and structure of interest groups that are changeable over of 
time. One prediction of this theory is that ownership is more concentrated in countries where the 
state plays a bigger role in the economy
12.  
The  Italian case has recently been analysed with regard to these new perspectives
13. The main 
results show that the ‘finance and law’ approach is not able to offer a satisfactory explanation of 
either  the  development  of  Italian  stock  market  or  the  ownership  structure  of  firms,  while  the 
‘political economy’ view offers a convincing explanation of the first issue but not of the second 
one.  
In this paper we deal with the control structures of Italian capitalism by using the ID technique 
which, fairly widespread during the first half of the XX century, has in recent times been re-utilised 
by sociologists, economists and economic historians for a variety of purposes, including analysis of 
inter-company links. By interlock is meant the link that is created between two units when a subject 
belongs to both; i.e. a director of two or more companies in the case of the study of the ownership 
structure. The analysis of ID comprises the reconstruction of the articulation of inter-individual and 
inter-company links by quantitative techniques of varying complexities. 
A distinction can be drawn between those who maintain that the existence of ID is irrelevant and 
those who believe that it is important for corporate control analysis. Amongst the former, there are 
the theorists of managerial control of the company, who hold that the control function is exercised 
by  management  inside  the  company.  The  board  of  directors  works  only  as  an  organ  of 
representation and as an image for the market. In these models, based primarily on the historical 
experience  of  the  American  public  company,  directors  do  not  play  any  operative  role  in  the 
company. The existence of ID is thus interpreted as an instrument of representation, useful only to 
reinforce the prestige of some companies or individuals
14. 
Amongst the latter, two approaches can be identified. The first one, which dates back to the Marxist 
theory of the hegemony of finance capital
15, states that the financial control of credit flows and,   4 
more rarely, part of the company’s equity, enables banks to determine companies’ policy. A major 
instrument to enforce this control is the presence of bank fiduciaries on company boards. 
The  second  approach  is  constituted  by  the  models  of  resource  dependence,  which  justify  the 
existence of ID on the basis of the optimising behaviour of companies. Restrictions on access to 
resources, information or market stimulate companies to create business groups, whose presence 
can be detected through the existence of ID. The hypothesis is that companies use ID as means to 
co-opt or absorb, partially or completely, other organisations with which they are interdependent
16.  
These different perspectives are mutually exclusive as each of them attributes the existence of ID to 
only one reason, justified by the theory. Opposed to these views, a pluralistic interpretation of ID 
has more recently been advanced. This approach places emphasis not on the reason but on the 
plurality of modalities in which the phenomenon of ID manifests itself. The underlying idea is that 
ID analysis cannot verify any theory ex ante but can be very useful in the understanding of a wide 
range of themes in business history and, more generally, in the ownership structure of a country
17. 
While  empirical  work  which  analyses  the  structure  of  Italian  corporate  network  through  a 
reconstruction  of  ID  during  the  fascist  period  is  limited  to  a  couple  of  pioneer  studies
18,  the 
panorama  of  available  studies  for  the  period  following  World  War  II  is  unquestionably  more 
consistent.  Immediately  after  the  War,  the  Economic  Commission  of  the  Ministry  for  the 
Constituent Assembly made a very detailed survey of Italian joint-stock companies
19. The study 
became the object of a political clash and was eventually never published. Nevertheless, the results 
were  made  known  in  numerous  works,  due  to  the  commitment  of  one  of  the  members  of  the 
Commission, Emanuele Rienzi of the Socialist Party
20. The main results of the survey consisted of 
verifying the existence, in spite of the presence of a large number of small share-holders, of a small 
number of large corporate groups which exercised a very strong domination over the entire Italian 
economy by controlling – either  directly or indirectly – three-quarters of the share capital of private 
firms. The concentration of capital was greater in the mining, iron and steel, mechanical, electrical, 
chemical,  and  textile  industries.  Within  this  framework,  the  four  larger  electrical-commercial 
holdings  –  Edison,  Società  Adriatica  di  Elettricità  (Sade),  La  Centrale,  and  Strade  Ferrrate 
Meridionali (Bastogi) – were particularly prominent. A closely knit intertwining of relations linked 
these companies to each other and to the other major private groups, such as Fiat (motor vehicles), 
Montecatini  (chemistry),  Italcementi  (cement),  Falck  (steel),  Pirelli  (rubber  and  cables),  Snia-
Viscosa (man-made fibres) and Italgas (gas), as well as to the big state-owned holding Iri. Rienzi 
also analysed – availing himself of techniques that were not particularly refined – the role played by 
a series of individuals whose presence on boards of directors was especially recurrent
21. 
In the early 1960s, the existence of a ‘power of availability’ – concentrated above all in the hands of 
several financial groups linked to the former electricity companies that had been nationalised in   5 
1962 – was confirmed, which managed a dense network of connections that branched out somewhat 
in  all  directions  and  towards  all  other  industrial  sectors
22.  When  analysing  the  effects  of  the 
nationalisation  of the electricity  industry,  Ragozzino  noted  that  this put  an  end  to  a  system of 
industrial and financial relations founded on the larger electrical-commercial companies that had 
maintained close relations with the banking and insurance systems. The consequence of this was the 
emergence of a new order in which the larger family groups, such as Fiat and Pirelli, returned to 
occupy a central position within the Italian corporate network
23. 
In the 1980s, two works by Chiesi
24 introduced to Italy the use of formalised network analysis 
techniques. The author pointed out the peculiarities of the Italian corporate network, attributing 
them to the range and modalities of state intervention in the economy and illustrating the existence 
in  the  mid-1970s  of  a  centre  of  the  system  inside  of  which  two  large  poles  cohabited,  based 
respectively on state and on privately owned enterprises
25. Their integration was guaranteed by the 
zipper function carried out by some companies – such as Sme, Bastogi and, to a lesser extent, Snia-
Viscosa and Tubificio di Brescia – on the boards of directors of which sat several of the major 
players in companies from both poles. Another aspect emphasised by Chiesi regarded the absence 
of  the  two  largest  private  groups,  Fiat  and  Pirelli,  from  the  centre  of  the  network.  Such  a 
circumstance, in contrast with Ragozzino’s thesis, was consequent on wider marginalisation of the 
private  groups  that  had  intrevened  after  the  nationalisation  of  the  electricity  industry,  to  the 
advantage of the state-owned groups, in the overall structure of the network. Chiesi’s analysis also 
dealt with the classical theme of relations between banks and companies, observing that the absence 
of large banks – with the sole exception of Imi and Efibanca – from the centre of the system 
depended on the effects of the 1936 banking law which, by separating the function of the collection 
of deposits from industrial credit, had rendered it impossible to re-establish those close relations 
between  banks  and  industries  that  had  so  strongly  distinguished  the  period  prior  to  the  crisis. 
Instead,  a  recent  study  by  Ferri  and  Trento  arrived  at  substantially  different  results:  basing 
themselves on a reduced sample of companies, they held that the relations between State-owned and 
private enterprises were a characterising trait of the Italian capitalistic structure, at least up until 
1970. In addition, as regards the relations between banks and companies, the empirical evidence 
exhibited by them is considerably different from that put forward by Chiesi. In fact, the two authors 
assert that, in spite of the implicit prohibitions in the banking law, solid cooperative connections 
between banks and companies represented a permanent trait of Italian capitalism
26. 
II 
The source used  for this work is Notizie statistiche sulle principali società italiane per azioni, 
edited by the Associazione fra le Società Italiane per Azioni (Asipa). The project of making an   6 
electronic version of this source, which was started a few years ago, has resulted in the Imita.db 
database
27. This contains information regarding companies, boards of directors, and balance sheets 
of  a  large  sample  of  Italian  joint-stock  companies  for  several  benchmark  years
28.  The  source 
includes all companies rated on one of the Italian stock exchanges, as well as those companies 
located in Italy which, at the close of the last balance sheet, had a deposited capital in excess of a 
certain threshold
29. The results obtained from its use, therefore, may tend slightly to overestimate 
the density of the whole system of ID, given the strong correlation between the number of ID and 
the size of companies. 
The data for all Italian joint-stock companies in the source, excluding Italian companies abroad and 
the foreign ones based in Italy, have been processed. As far as the directors are concerned, only 
those data regarding the members of a board of directors in the strict sense have been utilised, thus 
leaving out the members of Collegi sindacali
30. The sample used in this analysis, based on four 
benchmark years, includes about 130,000 seats belonging to almost 25,000 companies, for a total of 
more than 85,000 inter-company links. The names of the directors have been carefully standardised, 
so  as  to  make  them  as  homogeneous  as  possible.  However,  it  is  possible  to  estimate  that  the 
information on boards of directors contained in Imita.db has a margin of error of about 1.5 per cent, 
as is the case with other similar databases
31. These errors are mainly due to cases of homonymy, 
misprints, or shortcomings in the source. 
III 
An interlock, as noted above, is the link that is formed between two companies when a person is a 
director of both. The subject of this link is called  multiple director (henceforth MD). In this work, 
we have used primary interlocks without taking into account either the directionality or the strength 
of  the  links
32.  In  the  first  case,  it  is assumed  that  the  direction  of  the  interlock  goes  from  the 
company in which an individual director has a more important position to that in which his position 
is of lesser importance. In the second case, the connections between two companies are weighted by 
taking into account the number of directors who sit on the board of directors of both. To understand 
a system’s structure through the analysis of ID, we must adopt two perspectives: one concerning the 
single subject – i.e. the director – and the other the company. As a system’s structure is the result of 
an accumulation of directorships held by individuals, the boards of directors must be considered 
first. 
The average size of an Italian board of directors rose slightly between 1952 and 1960 – from 4.46 to 
4.52 members – fell to 3.86 in 1972, to rise again to 4.74 in 1983, as shown by Table 1. These 
values are considerably lower than those observed in the period prior to World War II, when they 
fluctuated around an average of 6 members per board
33. However, it must be kept in mind that, if   7 
for in 1952, 1960 and 1983 the size of the sample were quite similar, in 1972 the sample was 
considerably larger and included a higher number of small and medium-sized companies, which 
usually had smaller boards.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the system 
  1952  1960  1972  1983 
Companies  6,181  6,371  11,802  5,586 
Seats  27,427  28,813  45,543  26,470 
Directors  17,372  17,917  30,180  18,354 
         
Average size of the board  4.44  4.52  3.86  4.74 
CR Cumulation Ratio  1.58  1.61  1.51  1.44 
MD % Multiple directors  24.6  25.8  23.4  23.2 
 
 
An important measure in the description of the system is the ratio of MD to the total number of 
directors. As shown in Table 1, this ratio was stable over the entire period, which probably indicates 
that the links between companies were always  guaranteed by  a similar proportion of directors, 
although for 1960 it reaches a high of 25.8 per cent, then falls to 23.2 per cent in 1983. However, 
this  value  is  not  much  lower  than  that  observed  for  the  pre-World  War  II  period
34.  Another 
synthetic  measure  of  the  system  is  the  cumulation  ratio  (CR),  that  is,  the  average  number  of 
positions held by a single director. This, too, showed only small variations over time. The two 
indicators show a high level of concentration of the system when the latter is observed from the 
director’s viewpoint. The high CR is due to both the high ratio of MDs to the total number of 
directors and the remarkably high number of places held by MDs. 
The existence of a conspicuous number of MDs holding a total of more than 10 offices is indicative 
of the concentration of the system. Table 2 shows that the total proportion of seats held by these 
directors was higher than 4.5 per cent (5.3 per cent in 1952, 4.7 per cent in 1972, with a 6.3 per cent 
peak in 1960) in the first three benchmark years, to drop to 1.70 per cent in 1983. These directors 
are  commonly  referred  to  as  big  linkers.  Conversely,  the  directors  holding  only  one  office 
constituted almost three-quarters of the total, and and accounted for about a half of the positions for 
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Table  2.  Distribution  of  directorships  per  individual  in  boards  of  directors  ranked  by  size  (absolute  value  and 
percentage) 




boards  Total of seats 
Members of 
boards  Total of seats 
Members of 
boards  Total of seats 
Members of 
boards  Total of seats 
   ab. val.  %  ab. val.  %  ab. val.  %  ab. val.  %  ab. val.  %  ab. val.  %  ab. val.  %  ab. val.  % 
1  13,102  75.42  13,102  47.77  13,298  74.22  13,298  46.15  23,106  76.56  23,106  50.73  14,094  76.79  14,094  53.25 
2-10  4,176  24.04  12,868  46.92  4,500  25.12  13,710  47.58  6,929  22.96  20,273  44.51  4,226  23.02  11,927  45.06 
11-20  84  0.48  1,163  4.24  104  0.58  1,395  4.84  131  0.43  1,791  3.93  33  0.18  426  1.61 
21-30  6  0.03  144  0.53  10  0.06  227  0.79  11  0.04  265  0.58  1  0.01  23  0.09 
31-40  2  0.01  64  0.23  5  0.03  183  0.64  2  0.01  66  0.14  -  -  -  - 
41-50  2  0.01  86  0.31  -  -  -  -  1  0.00  42  0.09  -  -  -  - 
>50  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Total  17,372  100.00  27,427  100.00  17,917  100.00  28,813  100.00  30,180  100.00  45,543  100.00  18.354  100.00  26.470  100.00 
 
 
If the system is examined from another perspective, that is, by looking at the relationships between 
companies, some differences appear over the period which do not emerge as clearly when directors 
are considered. For the purpose of measuring the degree of cohesion in the system, three particular 
indicators – generally referred to as measures of connectivity – have been employed
35. The first is 
the traditional sociometric measure of density, defined as the ratio between the number of links 
between pairs of units and the number of all possible connections: 
D = L(r)/L(p) 
where L(r) is the number of real connections and L(p), defined as n(n-1)/2, indicates the number of 
all possible connections. The density indicates the degree of overlap between the companies in the 
system. Given the same number of companies, a greater density means tighter relations between the 
sub-systems. It is possible to notice that an increase in the number of companies causes a decrease 
in the density index: with the same number of links, the increase in the number of companies 
determines a decrease in the density. The index D varies between 0 and 1, i.e. for L(r)=0 and 
L(r)=n(n-1)/2, respectively. These refer, respectively, to the extreme cases of a total absence of any 
link and to that of the realisation of all possible links. 
The second measure, known as interlock position ratio (IPR), as defined by Mizruchi
36, represents 
the proportion of directors with a seat on another board, relative to the number of existing places on 
all boards of directors. This measures the orientation of the system towards the outside, and varies 
between IPR=0 in the case in which no link exists, and IPR=1 in the case when each available place 
in the board of directors gives rise to interlocks. 
A third measure, here referred to as concentration first four (CFF), represents the ratio between all 
interlocks and those generated by the first four companies graded by number of interlocks.   9 
It is clear from Table 3 that the density showed a certain stability between the first two benchmark 
years, which was followed by a 60 per cent decrease in 1972. This can be partly attributed to the 
increase  in  the  number  of  companies  of  about  85  per  cent  between  1960  and  1972,  thus 
considerably raising the denominator of the density index. The density rose in 1983, even if not up 
to the values it had in 1952 and 1960. This result was in great part affected by the sharp decrease in 
the size of the sample that – as we have seen – more than halved between 1972 and 1983.  Hence, 
these results should be considered with great caution. To evaluate more effectively the variations in 
the density index, we also calculated it from a sample comprising the top 250 and 500 companies in 
terms of capital. The results of this exercise, which obviously show higher values than those for the 
whole population of companies, are quite interesting. In this case, it is possible to compare all three 
benchmark years with no bias, and what emerges is a substantially similar degree of density for 
1952 and 1960, with the former presenting a slightly higher value. A strong reduction is confirmed 
for 1972, which was followed by an even sharper fall in 1983.  
 
 
Table 3. Network connectivity 
  1952  1960  1972  1983 
Density for the entire sample (x 100)  0.127  0.133  0.050  0.082 
Density for the top 250 firms (x 100)  6.6  6.3  4.1  2.2 
Density for the top 500 firms (x 100)  3.2  3.1  2.2  1.1 
IPR %  0.522  0.538  0.493  0.468 
CFF  1.43  1.23  0.93  1.16 
 
Another proof of the weakening of ID over time is provided by the decrease in the IPR index, which 
remained stable from 1952 to 1960, before significantly decreasing in 1972 and 1983. The CFF also 
diminished from 1.43 per cent in 1952 to 1.23 per cent in 1960, and to 0.93 per cent in 1972, to then 
rise to 1.16 in 1983. 
The dynamics of the system can be more fully understood by analysing the structure of ID by sector 
of activity of the companies (see Table 4). 
By looking at the overall data we have confirmation of what was observed previously: the number 
of interlocked companies reached its peak in 1960 (73.1 per cent), before dropping in 1972 to 67.6 
per cent and remaining at about the same value in 1983. This result seems to confirm a lower 
cohesion of the system in the two latest benchmark year, even if it must be recalled that the change  
in the number of companies between benchmarks could have affected it. These figures are, in any 
case, lower than those observed in the 1911-36 period
37. 
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1952  1960  1972  1983 
TOT  ID  % ID  TOT  ID  % ID  TOT  ID  % ID  TOT  ID  % ID 
A-B  Agriculture. forestry and fishing  241  152  63.1  158  101  63.9  256  187  73.0  166  103  62.0 
C  Mining and quarrying  127  99  78.0  144  107  74.3  162  115  71.0  36  27  75.0 
D  Manufacturing industry  3,019  2,132  70.6  3,163  2,262  71.5  6,140  4,051  66.0  2,910  1,855  63.7 
E  Electricity. gas and water supply  170  147  86.5  168  145  86.3  77  65  84.4  26  23  88.5 
F  Construction  196  142  72.4  181  124  68.5  427  277  64.9  243  152  62.6 
G-H-I 
Trade. transport. storage and 
communication 
1,033  731  70.8  951  691  72.7  1,701  1,122  66.0  645  384  59.5 
J  Financial intermediation  420  376  89.5  491  473  96.3  794  685  86.3  1,101  954  86.6 
j bank  Monetary intermediation (banks)  124  109  87.9  110  106  96.4  134  123  91.8  80  77  96.3 
j other financial  Other financial intermediation  224  198  88.4  304  291  95.7  541  449  83.0  927  792  85.4 
j insurance  Insurance and activities auxiliary  72  69  95.8  77  76  98.7  119  113  95.0  94  85  90.4 
K 
Real estate. renting. business 
activities 
804  509  63.3  963  646  67.1  1,970  1,307  66.3  374  268  71.7 
L-M-N-O 
Public administration.  health. 
social work and other social 
service activities 
171  104  60.8  152  106  69.7  275  170  61.8  85  51  60.0 
Total     6,181  4,392  71.1  6,371  4,655  73.1  11,802  7,979  67.6  5,586  3,817  68.3 
 
These insights  are  further strengthened by an  analysis of the average number of interlocks per 
company, by sector of activity (see Table 5). This indicator, which is not biased by the change 
occurred in the total number of companies, confirms that, in 1972 and 1983, the cohesion of the 
system was considerably reduced with respect to the two previous benchmark years. In fact, the 
average number of interlocks per company amounted to 7.8 in 1952, rose slightly to 8.5 in 1960, but 
then dropped to 5.9 in 1972 and to 4.6 in 1983. The decrease in the cohesion of the system is made 
even more apparent by comparing these data with those concerning the period prior to World War 
II, when the average number of interlocks per company fluctuated between a minimum of 11.0 in 
1936 and a maximum 16.8 in 1927
38. 
We then disaggregated the data at a sectoral level. The sectors that showed the greatest connectivity 
were those of financial intermediation – banks, insurances, and finance companies – and of utilities. 
In fact, these two sectors had much higher values than all the other ones with respect to both the 
share of interlocked companies and the average number of interlocks per company. Within the 
financial  intermediation  sector,  the  position  of  banks  and,  above  all,  insurance  companies  was 
prominent. The latter, in particular, exhibited the highest values in the whole system for the first 
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The trend of the indicators over time is particularly interesting. As far as financial intermediation is 
concerned, its values reached their peak in 1960, when 96.3 per cent of companies were interlocked. 
Also, the average number of interlocks per company showed the highest values in 1960, with 23.1 
links for banks, 18.4 for finance companies and 30.8 for insurance companies. In the two following 
benchmark  years, each  of the  three  subsectors  reported  a  reduced connectivity: both  indicators 
dropped considerably for finance companies, while the decrease for banks and insurance companies 
was less pronounced. In particular, in 1972 the average number of interlocks for banks was similar 
to that of 1960, with a value of 22.7 as against 23.1, but there was a slight reduction in the number 
of banks interlocked. The average number of interlocks per bank was slightly higher than in 1927 
and considerably higher than in 1936, probably indicating that the role of credit institutions within 
the system had not been reduced in the early 1970s in spite of the 1936 banking law
39. However, in 
1983 the average number of interlocks per bank dropped to 15.0, a circumstance in line with the 
diminution of the overall cohesion of the system.  
The trend of utilities, within which the electrical companies prevailed – until the electricity industry 
was nationalised in 1962 – appears to be particularly significant. In fact, the number of interlocked 
companies in this sector remained largely stable for the entire period, with values of about 85 per 
cent. However, the average number of interlocks per company varied considerably, moving from 
26.8 in 1952 to 26.2 in 1960, to only 8.6 in 1972 and 7.5 in 1983. The utilities companies that 
survived the nationalisation of the electricity industry retained their connections to the rest of the 
Sector of 
activity 
1952  1960  1972  1983 
A-B  4.7  6.1  5.1  2.7 
C  8.7  9.8  6.2  3.5 
D  7.1  7.2  5.4  3.8 
E  26.8  26.2  8.6  7.5 
F  8.4  9.0  5.5  3.0 
G-H-I  6.0  7.0  5.4  3.2 
J  18.8  21.4  16.3  8.1 
J banks  17.9  23.1  22.7  15.0 
J other financial  16.7  18.4  12.9  6.9 
J insurance  26.7  30.8  24.2  14.0 
K  4.7  5.2  4.3  4.9 
L-M-N-O  3.6  5.4  4.3  2.6 
Total  7.8  8.5  5.9  4.6   12 
system, but with the disappearance of the major electrical groups, they no longer constituted its 
centre.  
As is well known, the electricity industry in Italy had its origin in the late XIX century. In the 
1920s,  it  went  through  a  process  of  concentration  which  led  to  the  formation  of  five  regional 
monopolies: Sip in Piemonte; Edison in Lombardia, Liguria and Western Emilia; Sade in the north-
east, La Centrale in the centre including the capital, Rome; and Sme in the south
40. 
In the 1930s, after the collapse of the mixed banks and the setting-up of the state-owned holding Iri, 
the  larger  electrical-commercial  companies  assumed  a  pre-eminent  position  within  the  Italian 
corporate network. A close-knit intertwining of relations linked these companies to each other and 
to the other major state-owned and private groups. These relationships had their pivot in Bastogi, a 
former railway company which, after the nationalisation of the Italian railways in 1905, had turned 
into an electricity holding by investing the sums that it had received from the state, in compensation 
for the railway nationalisation, in securities of the major electrical-commercial companies. As a 
result, in the late 1930s Bastogi became the locus in which the new equilibria of Italian corporate 
network were settled. A new controlling syndacate configured Bastogi as a sort of centaur
41, half 
private and half state-controlled, jointly run by state-owned shareholders such as the Bank of Italy, 
Iri,  and  some  state-owned  banks,  and  by  the  major  private  groups  such  as  Edison,  Sade,  La 
Centrale, Fiat, Pirelli, and Ior, the Vatican bank. 
After World War II a sizeable proportion of members of the Economic Commission of the Ministry 
for the Constituent Assembly were in favour of the nationalisation of the electricity industry, but 
after the expulsion of the left-wing parties (Communist and Socialist) from government in 1947 this 
proposal was set aside. However, in 1962 the Socialists set the nationalisation of the electricity 
industry  as  a  binding  condition  for  their  entry  into  a  centre-left  governing  coalition  with  the 
Christian Democrats and other smaller parties. In the same year, the nationalisation law was passed 
by the Parliament and with the founding of Enel the State became Italy’s sole electricity supplier.  
The law forced the state to give the former  electrical-commercial companies the sum of 2,200 
billion lire in compensation for nationalisation. The underlying idea was that they could invest that 
money  to  boost  new  fast-growing  industries.  However,  the  former  electrical-commercial 
companies, including Bastogi, failed to define a coherent strategy for the use of such funds, and 
scattered  them  in  a  range  of  unrelated  investments  in  chemistry,  paper  mills,  agro-food,  white 
goods, construction, real estate, department stores, tourism, and local public services. As a result, 
they suffered heavy losses, most of them were taken over and by the early 1970s had disappeared 
from the centre of the Italian corporate network
42. 
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Table 6. Top 30 companies by number of interlocks and sector of activity 
Sector of activity  1952  1960  1972  1983 
D  5  6  5  7 
E  14  9  1  - 
F  -  -  -  - 
G-H-I  1  -  1  - 
J   7  12  20  22 
     J banks  1  4  6  2 
     J other financial  5  4  9  17 
     J insurance  1  4  5  3 
K  3  3  3  1 
L-M-N-O  -  -  -  - 
 
An analysis of the top 30 companies graded by number of interlocks (see Table 6) enables us to 
develop several further considerations. In 1952, there were four companies – Efi, Coniel, Bastogi, 
and Ras – which, above and beyond their ownership structure, seemed to function as bridging 
companies between the major state-owned and private groups (see Table 7a) . A strong prevalence 
of electrical companies can be noted, with 14 presences out of 30. Among the remaining companies, 
there were five manufacturing firms, five finance companies, and only one bank.  
Table 7a. List of the top 30 companies by number of interlocks (1952) 
#  Company  Nr. ID   Sector of activity 
1  E.F.I. ENTE FINANZIAMENTI INDUSTRIALI  181  J other financial 
2  CONIEL COMPAGNIA NAZIONALE IMPRESE ELETTRICHE  180  E 
3  SOCIETÀ ITALIANA PER LE STRADE FERRATE MERIDIONALI  173  J other financial 
4  RAS RIUNIONE ADRIATICA DI SICURTÀ  159  J insurance 
5  IDROELETTRICA SARCA MOLVENO  129  E 
6  EDISON  126  E 
7  TORINO ESPOSIZIONI  116  O 
8  CONDOR SOCIETÀ PER L’INDUSTRIA PETROLIFERA E CHIMICA  111  D 
9  FRANCO TOSI  100  D 
9  CREDITO COMMERCIALE  100  J banks 
11  ELETTRICA SARDA  99  E 
11  OSRAM  99  D 
11  S.R.E. SOCIETÀ ROMANA DI ELETTRICITÀ  99  E 
14  AUTOSTRADA TORINO MILANO  98  F 
15  GENERALE IMMOBILIARE DI LAVORI DI UTILITÀ PUBBLICA ED AGRICOLA  97  K 
15  SOCIETÀ ELETTRICA SELT VALDARNO  97  E 
17  SOCIETÀ PER LO SVILUPPO AGRICOLO DEL MEZZOGIORNO SVAM  96  K 
17  CIELI COMPAGNIA IMPRESE ELETTRICHE LIGURI  96  E 
19  ISTITUTO DI CREDITO PER LE IMPRESE DI PUBBLICA UTILITÀ  94  J banks 
20  F.I.A.T.  93  DM 
21  S.I.P. SOCIETÀ IDROELETTRICA PIEMONTE  92  E 
22  EMILIANA ESERCIZI ELETTRICI  89  E 
22  IDROELETTRICA MEDIO ADIGE  89  E 
22  OROBIA  89  E 
25  LA CENTRALE  87  J other financial 
25  STEI SOCIETÀ TERMO ELETTRICA ITALIANA  87  E 
25  VIZZOLA SOCIETÀ LOMBARDA DISTRIBUZIONE ENERGIA ELETTRICA  87  E 
28  SADE SOCIETÀ ADRIATICA DI ELETTRICITÀ  86  E 
29  CARTIERE BURGO  85  D 
30  SIEO IMPRESE ELETTRICHE D'OLTREMARE  84  E 
Table 7b. List of the top 30 companies by number of interlocks (1960)   14 
#  Company  Nr. ID  Sector of activity 
1  SOCIETÀ ITALIANA PER LE STRADE FERRATE MERIDIONALI  196  J other financial 
2  RAS RIUNIONE ADRIATICA DI SICURTÀ  185  J insurance 
3  ITALCONSULT  150  J other financial 
4  L'ASSICURATRICE ITALIANA  134  J insurance 
5  FRANCO TOSI  133  D 
6  EDISON  129  E 
7  ITALPI SOCIETÀ ITALIANA PARTECIPAZIONI INDUSTRIALI  127  J other financial 
8  MONTECATINI  125  D 
9  CREDITO COMMERCIALE  124  J banks 
10  EDISONVOLTA  117  E 
11  ELETTRONUCLEARE ITALIANA  116  E 
12  FINSIDER  113  J other financial 
13  PIRELLI  112  D 
14  SME SOCIETÀ MERIDIONALE DI ELETTRICITÀ  110  E 
15  ITALCEMENTI  109  D 
16  TORINO ESPOSIZIONI  105  K 
17  CARTIERE BURGO  104  DE 
18  STEI SOCIETÀ TERMO ELETTRICA ITALIANA  104  E 
19  GENERALE IMMOBILIARE DI LAVORI DI UTILITÀ PUBBLICA ED AGRICOLA  102  K 
20  FRATELLI BORLETTI  101  D 
21  SADE SOCIETÀ ADRIATICA DI ELETTRICITÀ  100  E 
22  BANCA UNIONE  99  J banks 
22  ITALGAS  99  E 
24  OROBIA  98  E 
25  COFINA COMPAGNIA FINANZIARIA INVESTIMENTI AZIONARI  96  J other financial 
25  EFIBANCA ENTE FINANZIARIO INTERBANCARIO  96  J banks 
25  SOCIETÀ ASSICURATRICE INDUSTRIALE  96  J insurance 
28  ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI  94  J insurance 
28  CIELI COMPAGNIA IMPRESE ELETTRICHE LIGURI  94  E 
30  BANCA PROVINCIALE LOMBARDA  93  J banks 
 
Table 7c. List of the top 30 companies by number of interlocks (1972) 
#  Company  Nr. ID  Sector of activity 
1  RAS RIUNIONE ADRIATICA DI SICURTÀ  194  J insurance 
2  BASTOGI FINANZIARIA  183  J other financial 
3  L'ASSICURATRICE ITALIANA  150  J insurance 
4  UNIONE ITALIANA DI RIASSICURAZIONE  124  J insurance 
5  FRANCO TOSI  121  D 
6  EFIBANCA ENTE FINANZIARIO INTERBANCARIO  120  J banks 
7  CREDITO COMMERCIALE  116  J banks 
8  BANCA D’AMERICA E D’ITALIA  113  J banks 
9  SNIA VISCOSA SOCIETÀ NAZIONALE INDUSTRIE APPLICAZIONI VISCOSA  111  D 
10  GENERALE IMMOBILIARE DI LAVORI DI UTILITÀ PUBBLICA ED AGRICOLA  108  K 
11  BANCA PROVINCIALE LOMBARDA   105  J banks 
12  ITALCABLE SERVIZI CABLOGRAFICI RADIOTELEGRAFICI E RADIOELETTRICI  104  I 
13  ITALGAS SOCIETÀ ITALIANA PER IL GAS  103  E 
14  SME SOCIETÀ MERIDIONALE FINANZIARIA  102  J other financial 
15  ISTITUTO BANCARIO ITALIANO  98  J banks 
15  STET SOCIETÀ FINANZIARIA TELEFONICA  98  J other financial 
17  LA CENTRALE FINANZIARIA GENERALE  97  J other financial 
18  UNIONE SUBALPINA DI ASSICURAZIONI  96  J insurance 
19  ITALCEMENTI FABBRICHE RIUNITE CEMENTO  95  D 
19  ISTITUTO DI CREDITO PER LE IMPRESE DI PUBBLICA UTILITÀ  95  J other financial 
21  CEMENTERIE SICILIANE  94  D 
21  TORO ASSICURAZIONI COMPAGNIA ANONIMA D’ASSICURAZIONI TORINO  94  J insurance 
21  ISTITUTO CENTRALE DI BANCHE E BANCHIERI  94  J banks 
24  MEDEDIL SOCIETÀ EDILIZIA MEDITERRANEA   93  K 
24  BANCO DI ROMA  93  J banks 
26  I.M.I ISTITUTO MOBILIARE ITALIANO   92  J other financial 
27  INIZIATIVE NAZIONALI AUTOSTRADALI SINA  90  K 
27  ITALPI SOCIETÀ ITALIANA PARTECIPAZIONI INDUSTRIALI  90  J other financial 
29  INSUD NUOVE INIZIATIVE PER IL SUD  89  J other financial 
29  SIEMENS ELETTRA  89  D 
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Table 7d. List of the top 30 companies by number of interlocks (1983) 
#  Company  Nr. ID  Sector of activity 
1  ISTITUTO CENTRALE DI BANCHE E BANCHIERI  78  J other financial 
2  SNIA BPD  75  D 
3  UNIONE ITALIANA DI RIASSICURAZIONE  72  J insurance 
4  RAS RIUNIONE ITALIANA DI SICURTÀ  69  J insurance 
5  SOCIETÀ ITALIANA ASSICURAZIONE CREDITI SIAC  64  J insurance 
6  METALLURGICA ITALIANA SMI  58  J other financial 
7  MONTEDISON  57  D 
8  EFIBANCA ENTE FINANZIARIO INTERBANCARIO  55  J other financial 
8  FINANZIARIA DI SVILUPPO FIDIS  55  J other financial 
10  LA CENTRALE FINANZIARIA GENERALE  54  J other financial 
11  ING. C. OLIVETTI & C.   53  D 
11  COMPAGNIE INDUSTRIALI RIUNITE CIR  53  J other financial 
11  CIGAHOTELS COMPAGNIA ITALIANA GRANDI ALBERGHI  53  J other financial 
11  EUROMOBILIARE  53  J other financial 
15  FIAT AUTO  52  D 
16  BANCA D’AMERICA E D’ITALIA  51  J banks 
17  IFIL FINANZIARIA DI PARTECIPAZIONI  50  J other financial 
18  SOCIETÀ PER LO SVILUPPO DI INTESE IMPRENDITORIALI CONSORTIUM  49  J other financial 
18  I.M.I. ISTITUTO MOBILIARE ITALIANO ROMA  49  J other financial 
20  GILARDINI  48  D 
20  ISTITUTO FINANZIARIO PER L’INDUSTRIA EDILIZIA FINANCE  48  J other financial 
22  ATTIVITÀ IMMOBILIARI  47  K 
22  GENERALE MOBILIARE INTERESSENZE AZIONARIE GEMINA  47  J other financial 
24  BASTOGI IRBS   46  J other financial 
24  AGRICOLA FINANZIARIA  46  J other financial 
24  COMPAGNIA FINANZIARIA LIGURE PIEMONTESE COFILP   46  J other financial 
27  ACCIAIERIE E FERRIERE LOMBARDE FALCK  45  D 
28  TEKSID  44  D 
28  NUOVO BANCO AMBROSIANO  44  J banks 
28  FINANZIARIA REGIONALE PIEMONTESE  44  J other financial 
 
In 1960, more than a half of the companies included in the top 30 in the previous benchmark year 
no longer appeared (see Table 7b), indicating that a substantial change had occurred. The number of 
electrical companies dropped to nine, while the financial intermediaries rose to 12: four finance 
companies, four banks and four insurance firms. Manufacturing firms, in their turn, rose to six. The 
overall impression is that the presence of bridging companies limited to the electricity sector was 
reduced, and replaced by companies – above all in insurance and finance – in which the large 
electrical groups cohabited with the representatives of the other industrial sectors. 
In 1972, the rate of permanency decreased by one (from 13 to 12) from the previous benchmark 
year (see Table 7c), in spite of the nationalisation of the electricity industry and the transformation 
of the former electrical  companies into finance  holdings. As a  consequence, the utilities sector 
almost disappeared from the top 30, while financial intermediaries marked a further substantial 
increase: the number of finance companies rose to nine, banks to six and insurance companies to 
five. 
In 1983, the rate of permanency had further decreased to nine (see Table 7d). Finance companies 
jumped to 17, therefore establishing a strong prevalence among the top 30. Manufacturing firms, in 
their  turn,  rose  to  seven,  from  five  in  the  previous  benchmark  year.  Conversely,  insurance 
companies dropped to three and banks to two. Also real estate companies fell from three to one 
while utilities definitely disappeared from the top 30.     16 
IV 
An analysis of the behaviour of big linkers (henceforth BL) can be very useful for interpretative 
purposes. A close examination was thus made of the 25 most important BL who, in each benchmark 
year, accumulated the largest number of positions
43. The list of these individuals, together with the 
age and attendance figures for each one, is provided in Table 8. Above all, it can be noted that 
several individuals appear several times. One individual, Carlo Pesenti, appeared in all the four 
benchmark years considered; four (Massimo Spada, Mizzi, Radice Fossati and Lazzati) figure in the 
list for three benchmark  years; ten (Valerio, De Biasi, Bruno, Bonadè  Bottino, Beria,  Bozzola, 
Samaritani, Bobbio, Rossello, and Prinetti Castelletti) appeared in 1952 and 1960, but not in 1972 
and 1983, while Torchiani, who was absent in 1952, met both in 1960 and 1972, to then disappear 
in 1983. The 104 places available were covered by 83 persons, 16 of whom (19 per cent of the total) 
appeared more then once. The continuity appears very strong between 1952 and 1960: of the 26 BL 
identified in 1952, 13 of them (50 per cent) also appeared in 1960. Instead, the subsequent interval 
seems to have been marked by considerable and increasing discontinuity: six of the 25 BL (24 per 
cent) of 1960 also figured in 1972, and only three of the 29 BL (little more than 10 per cent) of 
1972 also appeared in 1983. 
Table 9 reports some personal data on BL. The mean age increased constantly in the first three 
benchmark years, raising from 59 years in 1952 to 60 in 1960, and to 62 in 1972. It is, therefore, 
surprising that the more accentuated renewal which occurred in the population of BL during the 
second  interval  considered  (from  1960  to  1972)  was  marked  by  an  ageing,  rather  than  by  a 
rejuvenating, of them. The impression is that the real generational change amongst BL occurred 
only in the subsequent interval (from 1972 to 1983), when an even more pronounced (nearly 90 per 
cent) renewal in the population of BL was characterised by a remarkable rejuvenation of them, with 
the mean age falling from 62 to 56 years and the median age from 62 to 51 years. 
Table 10 shows the distribution of BL by region of birth. First of all, it can be noted that six regions 
out of 20 never supplied any BL. Among the regions represented, in 1952 Lombardia was pre-
eminent,  but  its  importance  diminished  in  the  next  two  benchmark  years.  In  contrast,  Emilia-
Romagna emerged, catching it up in first place in 1972. All things considered, while in 1952 and 
1960 there was a prevalence of individuals born in the regions of the country of most established 
industrialisation – the Industrial Triangle formed by Piemonte, Lombardia and Liguria – in 1972 
this was no longer the case. In that year, in fact, the Industrial Triangle was surperseded by the 
regions of central and north-eastern Italy of more recent industrialisation (Trentino-Alto Adige, 
Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, and Umbria), while the BL born in southern Italy and on the islands also 
increased over the period considered.  Table 8. Big linkers in the benchmark years 
1952  1960  1972  1983 
Surname and name  Age  Seats  Surname and name  Age  Seats  Surname and name  Age  Seats  Surname and name  Age  Seats 
1. Valerio Giorgio  48  44  1. Pesenti Carlo  53  38  1. Spada Massimo  67  42  1. Gianzini Enrico  69  23 
2. De Biasi Vittorio  57  42  2. Spada Massimo  55  38  2. Peenti Carlo  65  33  2. Mattioli Francesco P.  43  20 
3. Bruno Luigi  56  33  3. Bruno Luigi  64  37  2. Zuccolotto Oscar  -  33  3. Spada Antonio  51  16 
4. Ottolenghi Enrico  64  31  4. Bozzola Carlo  -  35  4. Quaratino Licio  -  26  4. Gardini Raul  50  15 
5. Pesenti Carlo  45  28  4. De Biasi Vittorio  65  35  4.RadiceFossati Eugenio  62  26  4. Pesenti Carlo  76  15 
6. Cartesegna Francesco  70  27  6. Rossello Mario  83  26  4. Riffeser Bruno  46  26  4. Pesenti Giampiero  52  15 
7. Spada Massimo  47  25  7. Samaritani Aldo                          56  25  4. Rovelli Nino  55  26  4. Segre Giulio  -  15 
8. Bonadè Bottino Vittorio  63  22  7. Valerio Giorgio  56  25  8. Zurzolo Antonio  49  25  8. Garrino Gian Luigi  48  14 
9. Beria Biagio  63  21  9. Bonadè Bottino Vittorio  71  22  9. Monti Attilio  66  24  8. Lattuada Carlo  70  14 
9. Corridori Giuseppe  64  21  9.Lodolo D’Oria Alessandro  -  22  10. Dosi Mario  69  23  8. Sterza Giancarlo  -  14 
11. Bozzola Carlo  -  20  9. Mizzi Leonida  56  22  10. Ferrari Alberto  58  23  11. Del Pra Giovanni  49  13 
11. Malnati Carlo  43  20  9. Torchiani Tullio  59  22  10. Galeati Giambattista  72  23  11. Garuzzo Giorgio  45  13 
11. Nogara Bernardino  82  20  13. Beria Biagio  71  21  13. Bassetti Giovanni  79  22  11. Piantà Enrico  57  13 
11. Samaritani Aldo  48  20  13. Marchesano Enrico  66  21  14. Martelli Giuseppe  65  21  11. Romiti Cesare  60  13 
15. Boeri Giovanni Battista  69  19  13.PrinettiCastelletti Ignazio   -  21  15. Baldini Riccardo  62  20  11. Saporiti Gian Alberto  -  13 
15. Parodi Giacomo  -  19  16. Bobbio Carlo  74  19  15. Costa Angelo  71  20  16. Belloni Antonio  64  12 
15. Vola Annibale  -  19  16. Radice Fossati Eugenio  50  19  15. Mizzi Leonida  68  20  16.CastenuovoTedescoMichele  59  12 
18. Bobbio Carlo  66  18  16. Rossi Guido  29  19  15. Torchiani Tullio  71  20  16. Conciato Alvise  -  12 
18. Camerana Giancarlo  43  18  19. Faina Carlo  66  18  19. Villa Alessandro  -  19  16. De Benedetti Carlo  49  12 
18. Luraghi Giuseppe  47  18  19. Lazzati Gaetano  45  18  20. Bassetti Giansandro  49  18  16. Falck Alberto  45  12 
18. Mizzi Leonida  48  18  19. Zanon Valgiurata Lucio  66  18  20. Bernero Virginio  -  18  16. Ferruzzi Arturo  43  12 
18. Prinetti Castelletti Ignazio  -  18  22. Balella Giovanni  67  17  20. Bucarelli Domenico  -  18  16. Lazzati Gaetano  68  12 
18. Rossello Mario  75  18  22. Falck Giovanni  60  17  20. Capanna Alberto  62  18  16. Radice Fossati Eugenio  73  12 
18. Valletta Vittorio  69  18  22. Fontaliran Jean  -  17  20. Corsi Giorgio  49  18  16. Vezzalini Giancarlo  51  12 
25. Bracco Roberto  49  17  22. Molteni Guido  56  17  20. Jacoboni Attilio  67  18  16. Vitale Marco  47  12 
25. Casoni Gaetano  73  17        20. Lazzati Gaetano  57  18       
            20. Lolli Ettore  64  18       
            20. Maccaferri Guglielmo  60  18       
            20. Valeri Manera Mario  51  18       
 Table 9. Big linkers by age 
Age  1952  1960  1972  1983 
Minimum  43  29  46  43 
Mean  59  60  62  56 
Median  60  59  62  51 
Maximum  82  83  79  76 
Variance (s
2)  132  122  71  105 
 
 
Table 10. Big linkers by region of birth 
Region  1952  1960  1972  1983 
Piemonte  2  4  1  4 
Lombardia  9  7  6  10 
Liguria  1  -  2  - 
Trentino-Alto Adige  -  -  1  - 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia  -  -  -  1 
Emilia-Romagna  2  2  6  3 
Toscana  2  1  1  1 
Umbria  1  1  1  - 
Lazio  3  2  2  2 
Abruzzo  -  -  1  - 
Campania  1  1  -  - 
Puglia  -  -  1  - 
Sicilia  -  1  -  - 
Sardegna  -  1  2  - 
Total  21  20  24  21 
Unknown  5  5  5  4 
 
 
However, in 1983 the situation was totally reversed, with  Lombardia re-surging to the pre-eminent 
position it occupied more than 30 years earlier and Emilia-Romagna falling remarkably behind, 
superseded by Piemonte too. Such a circumstance probably reflected a coming back of the larger 
finance and industrial groups of the Industrial Triangle to the centre of the system as a consequence 
of their massive technological and organisational restructuring (and return to profitability) in the 
early 1980s. 
The level of education of BL was very high (see Table 11): there were 21 university graduates in 
1952, 22 in 1960, 24 in 1972, and 19 in 1983. Significant changes were registered in the type of 
university degree held. While degrees in engineering prevailed in 1952, over the course of time the 
situation changed to the advantage of graduates in jurisprudence and, above all, in economics and   19 
business  management.  This  might  be  an  indication  of  the  declining  importance  of  a  technical 
culture, previously identified by calculating the number of engineers present on boards of directors 




Table 11. Big linkers by level of education 
  1952  1960  1972  1983 
University degree  21  23(*)  24  19 
- Engineering  10  12  7  6 
- Jurisprudence  6  8  7  2 
- Economics and business management  4  4  9  10 
- Agriculture  1  -  -  - 
- Chemistry  -  -  1  1 
Diploma  5  2  3  3 
- Accountancy  5  2  2  1 
- Technical school  -  -  1  - 
- Agriculture  -  -  -  1 
- Land surveyor  -  -  -  1 
Other or not indicated  -  1  2  3 
Total  26  26  29  25 
(*) In 1960 the number of university degrees exceeded the number of university graduates by one, since one of the big 




Tables 12 to 15 supply the matrices of the director-by-director adjacencies, which report the ID 
existing between the BL in the four benchmark years
45. We can note that, after having risen slightly  
– from 530 to 566 – between 1952 and 1960, the total number of ID between BL dropped to 364 in 
1972 and to 238 in 1983. This was a reduction which, due to its considerable size, appeared as a 
further sign of a decrease in the degree of cohesion in the system after the nationalisation of the 
electricity industry, even if the 1983 figure has been affected by the reduced size of the sample 
covered by Imita.db in that year.  
In 1952, only one individual was not linked to any other BL, and only seven others numbered less 
than ten ID. At the head of the classification there were two very weel-known figures, Giorgio 
Valerio and Vittorio De Biasi – both managing directors of the most important electrical company 
in the country, Edison – with 68 and 55 ID, respectively. What is striking is the large number of ID 
(33) that linked these two individuals to each other and both of them to another managing director 
of Edison, Carlo Bobbio (17 for Valerio and 14 to De Biasi). In third place figured a relatively little-  20 
known figure, Francesco Cartesegna with 43 ID. He actually jumped to first place if we consider the 
number of other BL with whom at least one ID existed as he was linked to 15 of them.  
Also in 1960 there was only one individual who had no ID with any other BL, while another seven 
had less than ten. The BL with the gretest number of ID were still those linked to the electrical 
industry. At the top of the classification, in spite of his dropping to seventh place in the number of 
presences on boards of directors, remained Giorgio Valerio with 58 links, followed by Vittorio De 
Biasi with 56 links, 27 of which with Valerio. In third place was the other managing director of 
Edison, Carlo Bobbio, with 43 links (14 with Valerio and 12 with De Biasi). 
In 1972, the drastic reduction in the number of ID existing among BL was accompanied by an 
increase in the number of individuals not connected to any other BL – risen to three – and in those 
connected by less than ten ID, who jumped to 13 out of 29 BL. The individual with the highest 
number of ID was Massimo Spada, principal trustee of Vatican finance, with 34 links, followed by 
Carlo Pesenti – boss of Italcementi, the major cement producer in the country – and Bruno Riffeser 
– executive of the Monti group, a conglomerate present above all in the oil, sugar, and publishing 
sectors, which had greatly expanded in the 1960s and early 1970s – with 30 links each.  
In 1983, the individuals who had no ID with any other BL had risen to four, while those connected 
by less than ten ID had diminished to eight. The figure with the greatest number of ID was Cesare 
Romiti, managing director of Fiat, with 29 links, followed by two other top executives of Fiat, 
Giorgio Garuzzo and Gian Luigi Garrino, with 26 and 24 links, respectively. Such a circumstance 
seems to be indicative of the establishing of Fiat in a central position within the system. 
 



























































































































































































































Valerio    33  3  2  2  2  1            2    1      17  1        2  1  1    68 
De Biasi  33    2  2    1                  1      14  1        1        55 
Bruno  3  2    1    10        1                1        12    3  1  1  35 
Ottolenghi  2  2  1    1  3  1                        1  13              24 
Pesenti  2      1    3  6      2      3  1                  2  3      23 
Cartesegna  2  1  10  3  3      4  1  1      2        1    3      7  1  3    1  43 
Spada  1    5  1  6                1                    1  1      11 
Bonadè B.            4      7    2      1      6    7          4      31 
Beria            1    7      2            4    4          2      20 
Corridori      1  1  2  1                  1                        5 
Bozzola                2  2                3    1        1        9 
Malnati                                                      0 
Nogara  2        3  2  1              1  3  1              1  1      15 
Samaritani          1      1          1                1      1      5 
Boeri  1  1                1      3        1  1          2        10 
Parodi                          1                            1 
Vola            1    6  4    3                6          3      23 
Bobbio  17  14  1    1                    1                  1      35 
Camerana  1    3  1    3    7  4    1            6              7    1  32 
Luraghi        13                                              13 
Mizzi                            1                          1 
Prinetti C.      12      7                                        1  20 
Rossello  2  1      2  1  1        1    1    2      1            1      13 
Valletta  1    3    3  3  1  4  2        1  1      3    7        1    1    31 
Bracco  1    1                                          1      3 
Casoni      1      1                          1      1          4 
Total  68  55  35  24  23  43  11  31  20  5  9  0  15  5  10  1  23  35  32  13  1  20  13  31  3  4  530 

























































































































































































































Pesenti    9  1    3  4  1  4        6    3    3      1      1  6      42 
Spada  9          8    2        5    5    1  1    2      2  4      39 
Bruno  1      1  1  1        16          17  1  2    1        1      41 
Bozzola            1      4        4                  1        10 
De Biasi  3    1      1    21    1    2    1    12  1            3    10  56 
Rossello  4  8  1  1  1      3    1    4    4    2  2  1  4    2    4      42 
Samaritani  1                                3                  4 
Valerio  4  2      21  3        1    3    2    14  1    1        3    3  58 
Bonadè B.        4                  4                          8 
Lodolo      16    1  1    1        1      12        1              33 
Mizzi                                                    0 
Torchiani  6  5      2  4    3    1        4    2      2        3      32 
Beria        4          4                    1          1    10 
Marchesano  3  5      1  4    2        4        1  2    1      2  2      27 
Prinetti C.      17              12            1      1              31 
Bobbio  3  1  1    12  2    14        2    1  1    1            2    3  43 
Radice F.    1  2    1  2  3  1            2    1        1      1      15 
Rossi            1                              1          2 
Faina  1  2  1      4    1    1    2  1  1  1              1        16 
Lazzati                                  1                  1 
Zanon di V.            2                        1                3 
Balella  1  2    1                    2          1              7 
Falck  6  4  1    3  4    3        3    2    2  1                  29 
Fontaliran                          1                          1 
Molteni          10      3                3                    16 
Total  42  39  41  10  56  42  4  58  8  33  0  32  10  27  31  43  15  2  16  1  3  7  29  1  16  566 




























































































































































































































































Spada    11      1    1      1        1        5          1  2      9    2  34 
Pesenti  11    1    1    1        1      2        6            2      6      30 
Zuccolotto              13                              8                21 
Quaratino                1                                            1 
Radice F.  1  1                        2    1    1                  2      8 
Riffeser                  14      16                                    30 
Rovelli  1  1  13                          1    1        10          1      28 
Zurzolo        1              1                            3          5 
Monti            14            11                                    25 
Dosi  1                        2      1        2      1        3      10 
Ferrari    1            1                  1                1    2    1  7 
Galeati            16      11                                          27 
Bassetti G.                    2                    4                    6 
Martelli  1  2      2                          8            1      1      15 
Baldini                                              2              2 
Costa          1    1      1                            1            4 
Mizzi                      1                                      1 
Torchiani  5  6      1    1              8            1      1  4      2      29 
Villa                                                            0 
Bassetti G.S.                    2      4          1            1    1        9 
Bernero                                                            0 
Bucarelli      8        10                                              18 
Capanna  1                  1          2      1                        5 
Corsi  2  2                        1    1    4    1              1      12 
Jacoboni                3      1                              1        5 
Lazzati                                        1          1          2 
Lolli  9  6      2    1      3  2      1        2            1            27 
Maccaferri                                                            0 
Valeri M.  2                    1                                      3 
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Gianzini      6  1                            1      1    1      10 
Mattioli  6        1      5        3    6    1                2    18 
Spada  1                                                  6 
Gardini                                          10          11 
Pesenti C.    1        11                            1            13 
Pesenti G.          11                              2      1      14 
Segre                1        1  1  1  1        6              11 
Garrino    5          1          6    6  3                  3    24 
Lattuada                                                    0 
Sterza                                                    0 
Del Pra                                                    0 
Garuzzo    3          1  6            6  5  1                4    26 
Piantà              1                    1    1              3 
Romiti    6          1  6        6      5  1                4    29 
Saporiti              1  3        5    5                    6    20 
Belloni    1                    1    1                        3 
Castelnuovo                          1            1              2 
Conciato  1                                                  1 
De Benedetti              6            1        1          2        10 
Falck          1  2                                        3 
Ferruzzi  1      10                                            11 
Lazzati                                      2              2 
Radice F.  1          1                                        2 
Vezzalini    2            3        4    4  6                      19 
Vitale                                                    0 
Total  10  18  6  11  13  14  11  24  0  0  0  26  3  29  20  3  2  1  10  3  11  2  2  19  0  238 
 
 
On the whole, different types of ID sometimes overlapped even in the presence of the same BL. The 
first type consisted of the memberships that were superimposed on share control relationships. This 
was the case, above all, of the top managers of large state-owned and private enterprises on the 
boards of directors of controlled companies. To this type of ID could be attributed, for instance, the 
numerous  presences  of  Giorgio  Valerio,  Vittorio  De  Biasi  and  Carlo  Bobbio  on  the  boards  of 
directors of companies belonging to the Edison group; of Vittorio Valletta and Cesare Romiti in the 
Fiat group; of Luigi Bruno in the La Centrale group; of Carlo Faina in the Montecatini group; and 
of Carlo and Giampiero Pesenti in the Italcementi group; of Giovanni and Alberto Falck in the 
Falck group; of Attilio Monti in the Monti group; of Nino Rovelli in the Sir-Rumianca group; of   25 
Carlo De Benedetti in the Olivetti group; of Raul Gardini in the Ferruzzi group; and of Alberto 
Capanna in the Finsider group.  
More significant, however, were the ID that existed between independent companies. Among these 
the most important were those that united industrial groups with banks and insurance companies. 
Only a few of these interlocks showed a directionality – one that was considered typical of the 
model  of  finance  capital  –  that  went  from  institutions  of  financial  intermediation  (banks  and 
insurance companies) to industrial firms. This circumstance is not at all surprising, for the banking 
law of 1936 had provided for a clear-cut separation of commercial credit from industrial credit. The 
only  cases  attributable  to  this  type  are  probably  those  of  Massimo  Spada  (whose  numerous 
presences derived from being the principal fiduciary for Vatican finance; Giovanni Battista Boeri 
(president of Crediop and Icipu) who in 1952 also sat on the boards of directors of companies of the 
Edison, Montecatini, Sade, Sme, Pirelli and Italgas groups; Giuseppe Corridori (president of the 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro [Bnl]) who in the same year numbered positions also in companies of 
the Iri, Snia-Viscosa, La Centrale and Gaslini groups; Alberto Ferrari (managing director of the 
Bnl) who in 1972 sat on the board of directors of a dozen  companies of the Montedison group and 
well  as  on  those  of  Ibm  Italia,  Efibanca  and  the  state-owned  holding  Insud;  and  Michele 
Castelnuovo Tedeschi, president of La Fondiaria [one of the major insurance companies in Italy] 
who in 1983 also sat on the boards of the Banca Commerciale Italiana, of Olivetti Leasing, La 
Magona d’Italia and Colorificio Romer. 
Conversely, there was a fairly good number of banking and insurance company ID generated by top 
managers of large industrial enterprises. In this case, the directionality did not range from banks (or 
from insurance companies) to industrial enterprises (as postulated by the finance capital model), but 
from the latter to the former. Thus, in 1952 the president of Fiat, Vittorio Valletta, also sat on the 
boards of directors of the Credito Italiano bank, of Efibanca and Ras, while Giorgio Valerio and 
Luigi Bruno – managing directors, respectively, of Edison and La Centrale, were present on those 
of  Efibanca.  In  1960,  Carlo  Faina,  president  of  Montecatini,  was  also  a  board  member  of  the 
Credito Italiano bank, of Assicurazioni Generali and of the three banches of La Fondiaria. In 1972, 
the oil industry executive Nino Rovelli, owner of Sir-Rumianca, also set on the board of directors of 
Ras. In the same way, in 1983 Raul Gardini – managing director of Ferruzzi – was also a board 
member of Credito Romagnolo while Alberto Falck – president of Falck – sat also on the board of 
directors of Ras.  
While, on the one hand, this type of ID reflected the changed-by-force relations between banks and 
industries that were consequent on the collapse of the mixed bank, it should not necessarily be seen 
as an expression of industrial enterprises’ domination of banks and insurance companies
46. Rather, 
it would seem to be a case of the  ID which Pennings termed ‘persuasive’
47. To understand its   26 
nature, it is necessary to consider the fact that the role played by banks and insurance companies 
was that of collecting information on the general trend of business and on the situation of the 
individual production sectors, which in a certain sense was similar to that of the trade associations. 
Banks and insurance companies thus ended up becoming depositories of information to which the 
top managers of industries could be very interested in having access. On the other hand, banks and 
insurance companies could have an interest in opening up their boards of directors to the executives 
of those industrial enterprises which, thanks to their size and solidity, could become top clients of 
theirs. 
Another type of ID consisted of the interlocks generated by individuals who sat on a large number 
of boards of companies belonging to several different entrepreneurial groups, but without having a 
‘strong’ or prevalent affiliation with any of them. Perhaps these were more interesting ID which, 
most of the time, were generated by relatively unknown figures – such as Francesco Cartesegna 
(1952), Bernardino Nogara (1952), Mario Rossello (1952 and 1960), Enrico Marchesano (1960), 
Tullio Torchiani (1960 and 1972), Eugenio Radice Fossati (1960, 1972 and 1983), Gaetano Lazzati 
(1960, 1972 and 1983), Giuseppe Martelli (1972), Ettore Lolli (1972), and Enrico Gianzini (1983) –  
who functioned as ‘go-betweens’ between the main state-owned and private groups, in many ways 
comparable  to  the  ‘network  specialists’  described  by  Stokman  and  Wasseur
48.  In  addition  to 
contributing to a more rapid circulation of information, these  ID seem to have performed – as 
Raffaele  Mattioli,  the  chairman  of  the  Banca  Commerciale  bank,  originally  observed
49  –  an 
essential function in ensuring a strategic coordination and stabilisation of the positions of control in 
the most important private entrepreneurial groups. 
One of the most prominent network specialists, illustrated in Figure 1, was Mario Rossello. Born in 
1877, Rossello, an accountant, became the Credito Italiano bank alternate auditor in 1913 and the 
following year, the bank’s statutory auditor. In 1918 he was hired and nominated central manager 
by the bank. In 1921 he was appointed managing director and remained in that office until 1924, 
when he transferred to the Banca Nazionale di Credito. He was the managing director of the latter 
institution and became its vice-president in 1927, upon the merger with the Credito Italiano, which 
he served as a board member until 1945. After World War II, his role tended to take on more and 
more of the characteristics of a financier setting himself up as a trait d’union between the nation’s 
leading  entrepreneurial  groups.  Thus,  in  1952  he  was  chairman  of  Franco  Tosi,  Compass  and 
Immobiliare Montecavallo, vice-chairman of Italcable and a board member for Edison, Bastogi, 
Distillerie Italiane (Eridania group), Rinascente (Borletti group), Rhodiatoce (Montecatini group) 
and another ten minor companies. In 1957, he returned as a board member for the Credito Italiano, a 
position he left finally in 1966. In the meantime, he had become chairman of Edison, vice chairman 
of  Società  Italiana  per  le  Strade  Ferrate  Meridionali  [Bastogi]  and  a  member  of  the  board  of   27 
Montecatini,  Snia-Viscosa,  Ras  (insurance)  and  two  small  banks:  Banca  Unione  and  Credito 
Lombardo. He died in 1973. 
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Abbreviations: Man. = Manufacturing; PU = Public Utilities; Comm. = Communications; RE = Real Estate; Ins. = 
Insurance. 
Note:  The  numbers  in  brackets  indicates  the  following:  on  the  left,  the  company’s  position  in  the  ranking  of  all 
companies in terms of capital; on the right, the company’s position in the sector’s ranking. J (financial intermediation, 
including banks, insurances, and finance companies) is considered as one sector. 
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A final topic covered by the analysis of BL concerns the relationship between large and small 
businesses and the presumed dwarfism of Italian industry. In fact, there were some individuals who 
seem to have been core figures in networks of companies strongly marked by local connections. 
Here the impression is that we are confronting different types of ID. On the one hand, we find a 
figure  like  Guido  Rossi  –  future  Consob  (the  Italian  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission) 
chairman, but originally linked up with Pirelli – who seemed to function as a vector of hierarchical 
relations, the expression of the dominance of a large industrial group over an aggregate of smaller 
firms. In fact, in 1960 he was director of Pirelli & C. (the group’s holding), two small Milanese 
banks, three finance companies and about ten small and medium-sized firms operating in Milan in 
the food, textile and mechanical sectors. On the other hand, it seems that there were links of a 
different  type,  illustrated  by  the  cases  of  Carlo  Malnati  and  Virginio  Bernero,  two  business 
consultants.  Neither  of  these  had  a  seat  on  the  boards  of  directors  of  large  companies.  Both 
concentrated their positions in small and medium-sized firms, the former in Milanese firms and the 
latter in Piemonte. They did not even have any connections with the other BL. It would seem that 
these figures served a very important function in ensuring the cohesion of two local networks that 
were the expression of the ability of some of the small and medium-sized firms – especially in the 
textile  and  mechanical  sectors  –  to  develop  interrelations,  create  alliances  and  gain  access  to 
strategic resources, without this necessarily involving subordinate relations with the banks or larger 
enterprises. 
V 
As we have seen in the preceding sections, during the entire period, banks – together with insurance 
companies – remained the sector with the highest average number of ID per company in the system. 
This feature undoubtedly depended on the size of the board of directors of banks, whose average 
was almost three times as large as that of the other companies. However, at the same time, it was 
also the sign of the peculiar role played by the banking sector in the system. As can be noted from 
Table 16, the number of banks included in the sample did not undergo important variations from 
1952 to 1972, but showed a substantial drop in 1983 (from 134 to 80). At the same time, MDs 
within the banking system (directors sitting on boards of two or more banks), after reaching a 9.14 
per cent peak in 1972, fell to 6.75 per cent in 1983. However, their number constantly showed 
values higher than those observed prior to World War II, when the role of banks was commonly 
believed to be central to the inner working of the Italian economic system. 
   29 
Table 16. Descriptive statistics of the banking system 
  1952  1960  1972  1983 
Firms  124  110  134  80 
Seats  1,263  1,189  1,599  1,067 
Directors  1,192  1,094  1,433  992 
         
Average size of board of directors  10.19  10.81  11.93  13.34 
CR Cumulation Ratio  1.06  1.09  1.12  1.08 
MD % Multiple Directors  5.03  7.04  9.14  6.75 
 
 
The same remark can be made for the CR. It therefore seems that the banking system increased its 
own cohesion, just at the moment – subsequent to the nationalisation of the electricity industry – in 
which it seemed to be regaining its own centrality within Italian capitalism. 
Table 17 shows the number of companies interlocked with banks, by sector of activity. The total 
number of companies linked to credit institutions remained stable between 1952 and 1960, and 
increased by 13.3 per cent in 1972, even if their proportion of the total population of enterprises 
dropped from 19.9 to 12.1 per cent. A further, even if slight, drop was observed in 1983. 
 
 
Table 17. Number of firms interlocked with banks, by sector of activity 
Sector of activity 
1952  1960  1972  1983 
Firms  ID  %  Firms  ID  %  Firms  ID  %  Firms  ID  % 
A-B  241  31  12.9  158  26  16.5  256  35  13.7  166  10  6.0 
C  127  22  17.3  144  22  15.3  162  17  10.5  36  4  11.1 
D  3,019  607  20.1  3,163  640  20.2  6,140  683  11.1  2,910  249  8.6 
E  170  66  38.8  168  64  38.1  77  16  20.8  26  7  26.9 
F  196  37  18.9  181  32  17.7  427  50  11.7  243  17  7.0 
G-H-I  1,033  178  17.2  951  144  15.1  1,701  183  10.8  645  64  9.9 
J  296  132  44.6  381  167  43.8  660  214  32.4  1,021  238  23.3 
J other financial  224  88  39.3  304  120  39.5  541  155  28.7  927  203  21.9 
J insurance  72  44  61.1  77  47  61.0  119  59  49.6  94  35  37.2 
K  804  123  15.3  963  133  13.8  1,970  182  9.2  374  54  14.4 
L-M-N-O  171  26  15.2  152  21  13.8  275  36  13.1  85  5  5.9 
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In Table 18, the intensity of the links between banks and other sectors is measured, using the ratio 
of the number of ID between banks and other sectors to the number of all possible ID:  
j i   ij ij d d / b    = r  
where bij is the number of ID between sector i and sector j; di is the number of places on the boards 
of directors of sector i, and dj is the number of places available in sector j. The greater the index, the 
higher the intensity of the links between the two sectors. In the case of no interlocks, i.e. bij =0, the 
intensity is rij =0. 
This index remained stable between 1952 and 1960, but showed a remarkable decrease in 1972. 
Probably, its reduction mirrored both the general drop in the system’s general cohesion, a good part 
of which was also due to the differing size of the sample, and – as a consequence of the increased 
weight of small and medium-sized companies in the sample – a specific decrease in the intensity of 
links between banks and manufacturing firms while, at the same time, those between banks and the 
other  financial  intermediaries  increased.  It  seems,  therefore,  that  the  banks  –  together  with 
assurance companies and some finance companies – inherited the role of the electricity companies 
at the centre of the system, while – at the same time – diminishing their connections with industrial 
firms. 
A further and sharp drop was observed in 1983, probably reflecting – in addition the diminution of 
the system’s general cohesion – a reduction of the weight of banks in the centre of the system to the 
advantage of major finance companies.  
Sector of activity 
1952  1960  1972  1983 
Intensity  Intensity  Intensity  Intensity 
A-B  4.82  5.76  4.67  1.51 
C  3.77  5.35  2.53  0.87 
D  25.82  29.50  20.11  9.49 
E  12.71  15.21  4.67  2.21 
F  6.44  6.05  4.66  1.89 
G-H-I  12.73  11.79  10.96  5.14 
J  22.15  27.42  31.67  25.24 
J other financial  24.23  28.22  31.55  26.03 
J insurance  15.33  16.79  20.82  8.93 
K  15.12  14.96  12.43  8.02 
L-M-N-O  5.34  4.27  4.96  1.26 
Total  41.05  46.21  36.73  24.22   31 
VI 
The analysis carried out confirms that Italian corporate network maintained substantial peculiarities 
also during the period following World War II. These originated from the rescue operations of the 
1930s, which had enlarged the state’s presence in the economy to an extent that had no comparisons 
in the other industrial countries of the West. In associating with the reassertion of the central role of 
private  property  in  the  national  economic  system,  this  circumstance  confronted  the  need  for 
coexistence  between  the  area  of  state-owned  enterprises  and  that  of  private  companies,  while 
avoiding the domination of either of the parties over the other. To this end, it was necessary to 
guarantee the stability of the orders of control of the major private companies
50, putting an end to 
the  disturbances  and  conflicts  that  had  distinguished  relations  during  the  early  decades  of  the 
twentieth century
51. 
The  stabilising  of  the  orders  of  control  of  the  major  private  groups,  among  which  the  large 
electrical-commercial  companies  stood  out,  was  favoured by  the  1942 Italian  Civil  Code
52 and 
pursued by resorting to a multiplicity of instruments: i) the pyramidal group, i.e. the organisation of 
production activity into an aggregate of legally-separate companies that were linked by chains of 
control, to the point that the capital owned by the controlling subject was concentrated in a single 
company placed at the head of the group, and that of the other share-holders was scattered among 
the subsidiary companies, so as to render ineffective their right to vote; ii) cross participations 
between  head-of-group  companies  and  controlled  companies;  iii)  cross  participations  between 
different  groups,  realised  through  bridging  companies;  iv)  exchanges  of  shares  with  insurance 
companies capable of supplying a cash support; v) the possibility, on the part of the directors, of 
collecting  the  vote  proxies  of  the  small  share-holders  without  any  particular  informational 
obligations  or  fiduciary  duties;  vi)  the  presence  of  statutory  regulations  aimed  at  discouraging 
takeovers, such as the right of directors to refuse to enter the names of new share-holders in the 
members’ register
53. These instruments were accompanied by the sharing of board members
54. 
The impression is that, in 1952, the function of ID in this context could be explained through a 
network of bridging companies, divided over two fundamental levels. The first included one group 
of companies (such as Bastogi, Efi, Ras, Condor, and Generale Immobiliare di Lavori di Utilità 
Pubblica ed Agricola) which functioned as a bridge between all the major state-owned and private 
groups,  both  electrical  and  not.  The  second  consisted  of  another  group  of  companies  (such  as 
Coniel,  Idroelettrica  Sarca  Molveno,  Idroelettrica  Medio  Adige,  and  Sieo  Imprese  Elettriche 
d’Oltremare) which carried out this same role limited to electricity groups, both private and state-
owned.   32 
In 1960, the importance of the top-level bridging companies seemed to have increased significantly. 
Evidently, the incumbent threat of a possible nationalisation of the electricity industry as well as the 
pursuing of a conglomerate-type diversification strategy had induced the major electrical groups to 
increase their links with the entire spectrum of interests in the large industrial and financial groups, 
while the relevance of bridging companies internal to the electricity sector had been reduced. New 
top-level  bridging  companies  –  among  which  several  insurance  and  finance  companies  were 
conspicuous – were added to those already in existence. The continuance of stable and elevated 
density indexes between 1952 and 1960 thus seems to have been accompanied by a re-equilibrium 
of the necessary relations between electricity and non-electricity, with the latter included by then in 
a position of equal prominence at the top of the system.  
Nationalisation  of  the  electricity  industry  led  to  a  dissolving  of  the  old  centre  of  the  system. 
Nevertheless, in 1972, a new centre had been formed or was in the process of being formed. Less 
strong and cohesive than the preceding one, it hinged on financial intermediaries: banks, insurance 
companies and the major finance companies. The rise in the number of finance companies among 
the top 30 in 1972, accompanied by a contemporary one-third drop in the average number of ID per 
company  may  indicate  that  a  bifurcation  had  taken  place  within  that  subsector  of  financial 
intermediaries. On the one hand, the major and well-established finance companies had been co-
opted within the new centre under formation. On the other hand, the considerable increase in the 
total number of finance companies that occurred between 1960 and 1972 seems to have been due 
above all to the reduction – as a result of the inversion of the economic cycle – in the self-financing 
capacity of the majority of industrial groups. This induced them to utilise this instrument – that is, 
the  setting  up  of  new  finance  companies,  often  with  relatively  small  boards  of  directors  –  to 
maximise their own capacity to incur debts, the net assets being equal, lengthening the corporate 
chain and optimising the management of financial resources
55.  
The in-depth examination made of the role of banks within the system arrives at conclusions that 
were similar to those proposed by Ferri and Trento
56, diverges from what Chiesi
57 and Amatori and 
Brioschi
58 upheld, and points out that the role of the banks remained important for the entire period, 
with  the  permanency  of  long-lasting  structural  links  with  both  industrial  firms  and  insurance 
companies as well as with finance companies. After the electricity industry was nationalised, banks, 
together  with  insurance  and  major  finance  companies,  returned  to  the  centre  of  the  system, 
reacquiring – at least in part – the position that they had held in the 1920s
59. 
This evolution was aided by the Bank of Italy, that in the decade following the nationalisation of the 
electricity industry gave the banking system a monopoly of savings collection in the country – that 
is, of fund raising for business financing – thereby curbing stock market development
60, an aspect 
which neither the ‘law and finance’ nor the ‘political economy’ approach addresses.    33 
It must be emphasised, however, that, while the banks maintained a fundamental role within the 
Italian capitalist system, the 1936 law produced a range of varied effects. On the one hand, formerly 
mixed banks were forced to make a profound change in their strategies, which led to an enormous 
reorganisation.  On  the  other  hand,  the  other  banks  –  particularly  the  smaller  ones  –  were  less 
affected  by  the  law’s  provisions
61.  Both  Banca  Commerciale  and  Credito  Italiano  significantly 
reduced their connections with other companies, from a few hundred in the 1920s and 1930s
62 to a 
few dozen, with a constantly downward trend, during the period taken into consideration. At the 
same time, in 1972, some small private banks, such as the Banca d’America e d’Italia, Credito 
Commerciale, Banca Provinciale Lombarda, and the Istituto Bancario Italiano, were at the top of 
the classification by number of ID. Thus, it does not seem that we can share the assertion according 
to which ‘the interlocks between banks and non-banking companies […] involved the state-owned 
banks to an almost exclusive extent’
63, while, with the exception of Efibanca, these were, instead, 
placed in a more peripheral position. 
The reduction in the degree of the system’s overall cohesion does not seem to have been devoid of 
repercussions  on  the  links  between  state-owned  and  private  companies,  even  if  the  empirical 
evidence is weaker in this case. In 1952, the two poles appear to be strongly inter-connected. Of the 
26 BL, 17 sat contemporaneously on the boards of directors of state-owned and private companies, 
and that simply through the links generated by these individuals, the companies belonging to Iri 
were linked to 15 out of the 20 most important private groups. In 1960, the situation remained 
substantially unchanged: the BL who accumulated memberships in both state-owned and private 
companies amounted to 15 out of 25. Through these, the Iri companies numbered links with 14 of 
the 20 major private groups. In 1972, the BL present in both state-owned and private companies 
were 16 out of 29; the Iri companies were connected to seven of the 20 major private groups, while 
two other State-owned groups – Eni and Efim – were connected to five and two large private groups 
respectively. 
Thus, the overall impression is that – contrary to the results obtained by Chiesi
64 using a different 
sample, according to which in 1976 the centre of the Italian corporate network was marked by the 
presence of two large poles, one state-owned and the other private, which were clearly distinct one 
from  the  other  –  as  far  as  1972  is  concerned,  the  events  following  the  nationalisation  of  the 
electricity industry had led to the formation of one new centre, that included both the state-owned 
and the private poles, even if the ties between them were less cohesive than in the 1950s and in the 
early 1960s. Among the evidence for this conclusion is the assertion that – as in 1972 – more than 
half  of  the  BL  sat  contemporaneously  on  boards  of  directors  of  both  state-owned  and  private 
companies,  while  none  gathered  his  directorships  entirely  within  the  state-owned  sector. 
Furthermore, an analysis on the ten state-owned companies included in the top 30 by number of ID   34 
for  that  year  shows  that  seven  of  them  shared  at  least  a  half  of  their  directors  with  private 
companies, ranging from five out of 14 directors for Sme (36 per cent) to nine out of 12 directors 
for Mededil (75 per cent). And – what is by no means less important – each of these state-owned 
enterprises was interlocked with a high number of private companies.  
However, in 1983 a substantial change seemed to be occurred in the centre of the Italian corporate 
network.  The  decreased  cohesion  of  the  system  was  accompanied  by  an  almost  complete 
disappearance of state-owned companies from the top 30 by number of ID, as they fell from ten to 
one – while the BL who sat contemporaneously on the board of directors of state-owned and private 
companies dropped to three out of 25. Now, through the links generated by these individuals, the 
companies belonging to Iri were connected to only four of the 20 major private groups, Eni to two, 
and Efim to no one.  If still in 1972 the centre was  characterised by  a remarkable presence of 
companies belonging to the major state-owned groups and by a strong interconnection between 
these and the major private groups, in 1983 this was no longer the case. Now, on the one hand, the 
centre seemed to hinge on private companies to a much higher degree than in the past, while state-
owned companies were put in a marginal position. On the other hand, state-owned and private 
companies were much less interconnected by the sharing of board members, a circumstance more in 
line with Chiesi’s argument. 
The overall impression is that between 1972 and 1983 the centre of the system had been reshaped 
around the pivotal role played by Mediobanca, the only real merchant bank operating in the country 
at that time. Mediobanca never appeared in the list of the top 30 companies by number of ID, 
however it is possible to notice than nearly two thirds of the companies included in the list for 1983 
– especially manufacturing companies belonging to the larger family groups and the larger finance 
companies – were close allied to it through credit relations, cross participations and Mediobanca’s 





This paper explores the structure of the Italian corporate network during the 1952-83 period by 
using  the  ID  technique.  The  paper  confirms  that  the  Italian  corporate  network  maintained 
substantial peculiarities in the period investigated. In particular, it argues that interlocks played an 
important  role  in  guaranteeing  the  stability  of  the  positions  of  control  of  the  major  private 
companies  and  their  connections  with  State-owned  enterprises.  In  1952  and  1960,  the  system, 
centred  on  the  larger  electrical  companies,  showed  the  highest  degree  of  cohesion. This centre 
dissolved after the nationalisation of the electricity industry in 1962 and was replaced by a new and 
less cohesive one, hinged on financial intermediaries: banks, insurance companies and some finance   35 
companies. More generally, contrary to conventional wisdom, we argue that banks maintained an 
important role throughout the period investigated. The 1936 banking law produced varied effects: 
formerly mixed banks were forced to make a profound change in their strategy and strongly reduced 
their connections with the rest of the system, while smaller private banks were less affected by the 
law’s provisions, and shifted to a more central position in the system. Furthermore, we showed that 
ID were not limited to the major groups, but also involved many smaller enterprises. This seems to 
counter  another  alleged  peculiarity  of  Italian  capitalism,  namely  the  presumed  dwarfism  of  its 
entrepreneurial base. In fact, as the sharing of one or more directors with another company is an 
element that makes it possible to broaden a company’s confines, we can assert that at least some of 
the small Italian firms were less small that what was commonly believed. 
Finally, the paper shows that state-owned and private enterprises were strongly interconnected from 
the early 1950s to the early 1970s. This led us to argue that in the 1970s the centre of the Italian 
corporate network was not marked by the presence of two poles, one state-owned and the other 
private, clearly distinct one from the other, but by one large pole, that included both state-owned 
and private enterprises. However, the situation changed in the early 1980s. At that time state-owned 
companies were marginalised and the centre of the system hinged on private groups and finance 
companies linked to Mediobanca, the only merchant bank operating in the country. 
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